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tial’s recovery in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding to the typed-
in amount, $92,885. According to the Wall Street Journal, a federal 
court held that Prudential was entitled to its full claim. However, 
Prudential had already settled for a lesser amount, about $12 mil-
lion. These facts turned into a litigation nightmare for the law firms 
involved. Milo Geyelin and Amy Stevens, Typo Causes Problems for 
Two Law Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1990, at B4. 
Daniel H. Borinsky 
Esquire Settlement Services 
Lake Ridge, VA 
A TAX OR NOT A TAX, 
THAT IS THE QUESTION 
To the Bag: 
In a letter published in the Spring 2011 issue, Jack Metzler said I 
had argued, in Prepositions in the Constitution, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 163 
(Winter 2011), “that a capped tax on income is unconstitutional 
because it is not a tax ‘on’ incomes, as permitted by the Sixteenth 
Amendment.” If that argument is right, Mr. Metzler added, he 
“take[s] it [that he] can stop paying Social Security.” 
That first quoted passage doesn’t get my argument quite right. 
Yes, a federal tax must be “on incomes,” within the meaning of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, to be valid – if it’s a direct tax and hasn’t 
been apportioned among the states on the basis of population. And 
I’m willing to concede that “a capped tax on income,” as Mr. Metzler 
put it, is a “tax on income” for this purpose. (In Ohio we call that a 
tautology.) In the unusual situation where a tax’s validity depends 
on the Amendment,1 however, what the tax is “on” is the question – 
                                                                                                 
1 Most federal taxes, although unapportioned, are clearly valid. (No tax has been 
apportioned since 1861.)  Indirect taxes (duties, imposts, excises) are not subject 
to apportionment to begin with. Direct taxes, however – including, at a mini-
mum, capitation and real-estate taxes – must be apportioned unless they’re “taxes 
on incomes.” The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, made the modern 
income tax possible: in 1895 the Supreme Court had held that the 1894 income 
tax was direct and, because it hadn’t been apportioned, unconstitutional. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954009
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it’s not a given – and a cap can affect that analysis. Some caps might 
be OK, others not so much. 
When it comes to determining what a tax is “on,” the Amend-
ment should be interpreted in light of its purpose: to make possible 
a system in which the well-to-do pay a fair share of taxes, which 
hadn’t been happening when Congress relied on tariffs and excises 
for revenue. With a “tax on incomes,” if you earn more, you should 
generally pay more. 
Suppose Congress were to impose a tax at a single rate (10%, 
50%, 90%, whatever) on the first $10,000 of every adult Ameri-
can’s “income.” Congress could call that a “tax on incomes,” I sup-
pose, but I wouldn’t and you shouldn’t – even if “income” were 
properly measured. With the low cap, almost everyone would be 
paying the same amount. That would be a lump-sum capitation tax, 
or close to it, not a “tax on incomes.” 
I know, I know – that’s a silly hypothetical. Let’s get real and 
consider Mr. Metzler’s reference to Social Security, an obviously 
important subject. I originally thought he might be suggesting that, 
because the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) 
“tax” has been subject to an annual income cap,2 and no one seems 
to question its constitutionality, caps don’t matter for Sixteenth 
Amendment purposes. But I now understand him to suggest that, if 
my argument about “taxes on incomes” has merit, there really might 
be a serious constitutional issue with the OASDI tax. 
I agree. We ought to be nervous about the constitutionality of 
the OASDI tax – if the Amendment is essential to that analysis. For 
years, that capped, regressive tax has represented by far the largest 
federal tax obligation for lower-income Americans. Perhaps none of 
that is critical, but it’s not what Sixteenth Amendment boosters had 
in mind.3 
                                                                                                 
2 The Medicare component of the scheme has, in contrast, not been subject to an 
income cap for some time.  
3 I address issues involving Social Security levies in a forthcoming article. See, if it 
ever comes out, Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 37 N. 
KY. L. REV. __ (2011). A draft is on SSRN; downloads are always welcome. 
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There’s a potentially easy way out, however. Many assume that 
unapportioned Social Security “taxes” are constitutional because they 
are “taxes on incomes.” But the Supreme Court has never said that,4 
and, to my mind, Social Security levies weren’t taxes at all as the 
system was created. If you make a payment to a government, and 
you get something specific in return – entry into a park, say – 
you’re not being taxed. And payors into Social Security are (or 
were) acquiring a specific benefit, a retirement and disability plan.5 
With that understanding, the Taxing Clause and the Sixteenth 
Amendment were irrelevant to constitutional analysis in 1935.6 The 
justification for the OASDI “tax” had to be found elsewhere, pre-
sumably in the Commerce Clause. 
But let’s assume arguendo that today we do need the Sixteenth 
Amendment to justify the unapportioned OASDI levy: assume, that 
is, that it is a tax, but it isn’t an indirect tax.7 Even if that’s the case, 
maybe the cap in its present form isn’t fatal. The argument goes like 
this: The cap does come into play for high-income folks, like big 
firm lawyers and Bag editors, for whom the OASDI obligation is a 
flat amount, unaffected by income above the cap.8 That’s troubling, 
but, as Steven Willis and Nakku Chung have noted, by far most 
                                                                                                 
4 See Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 
TAX NOTES 169, 187 (2010) (noting the pervasive assumption and dissecting it). 
5 You also get benefits from paying taxes, I’ve been told, but those are the more 
amorphous benefits of a civilized society – i.e., before the designated hitter and 
gangsta rap came along. 
6 The Supreme Court has referred to the levy as a “tax,” see, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 609 (1960), although not in evaluating constitutionality. On the 
other hand, the Court referred to Social Security “as a form of social insurance.” 
Id. On the other, other hand, the Court concluded that an employee has no “ac-
crued property rights” in his Social Security interest, id. at 610, and the interest 
“cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an annuity, whose right to 
benefits is bottomed on his contractual premium payments.” Id. This is hard, isn’t 
it? 
7 Most of my academic colleagues, however, believe that an income tax is indirect, 
and that the Sixteenth Amendment should have been unnecessary. In their view, 
the Court blew it in 1895. See supra note 1. 
8 See Willis & Chung, supra note 4, at 187.  
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Americans have incomes below the cap ($106,800 in 2010 and 
2011). Most therefore wind up paying a percentage of their earnings 
into the system, which sounds a lot like a “tax on incomes.”9 Devia-
tions from income norms occur at higher levels, to be sure, but the 
whole structure shouldn’t fall simply because the measure of “in-
come” isn’t perfect.10 
Despite the cap, the OASDI levy might therefore be treated as a 
“tax on incomes” and therefore unquestionably valid in its unappor-
tioned form.11 But I remain uncomfortable about all of this; I can 
imagine clearly problematic caps. In any event, I certainly wouldn’t 
infer, as many seem to, that, just because the OASDI levy is subject 
to a cap which might be consistent with a “tax on incomes,” any cap 
is therefore acceptable. That can’t be right. There are serious issues 
here, and I thank Mr. Metzler for raising the Social Security issue. (I 
advise him, however, to keep paying Social Security, at least for 
now.) 
Erik M. Jensen 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
Cleveland, OH 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
9 Id. at 188. 
10 Suppose what is otherwise unquestionably an unapportioned tax on incomes 
provides for a 0% rate on taxable income above $1 billion. That cap would affect 
almost no one. Surely it shouldn’t affect the legitimacy of the tax. 
11 I reemphasize, however, that if the levy isn’t a tax or if it’s an indirect tax, the 
Amendment matters not a whit. See supra note 1; cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Radical 
Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
833, 843 n.58 (1999) (describing unsuccessful constitutional challenges to Social 
Security taxes). 
